Said Haddadi examines the interaction between security and democracy discourses and their mutually affecting relationship within the framework of the political and security basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In this context, Haddadi places special emphasis on the role that institutions and practices within the EMP may play in contributing to the convergence of security and democracy views between the EU and North Africa. Against this background, this paper assesses the main arguments that underlie the political and security partnership within the EMP. The focus is on the process that led to the EU's 'securitization' of the Maghreb, that is, the EU's prioritization of security concerns relating to North Africa. Haddadi's analysis of the interaction between security and democracy discourses in the EU and in North Africa points to a number of inconsistencies and dilemmas that are not sufficiently addressed by the institutions and practices of the EMP.
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The bread riots that spread across the Maghreb countries by the end of the first half of the 1980s -as a result of the economic consequences of droughts, the restructuring programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the oil crisisand culminated in the October 1988 riots in Algeria, raised serious concerns in Europe about security and stability in neighbouring North Africa. These concerns were fuelled by the ascent of political Islam and the subsequent outbreak of internecine violence in 1992
and its endurance for almost a decade in Algeria. This situation triggered recurrent speculations about a 'domino effect' that would spread Islamist violence to next-door Morocco and Tunisia, especially considering the fragile socio-political and economic situation in these two countries. Such scenarios have provided firewood for a heightened level of securitisation targeting North Africa and the southern Mediterranean as a whole, a securitisation discourse that presented the region as a clear and imminent danger to security in Europe (Buzan et al., 1998) . At the heart of this security discourse lies the urgent need to ensure political stability and promote democracy as vectors for building a security partnership in the region.
To respond to these security concerns, the EU -at the behest of its southern members in particular -started to rethink its discourse and policies for the region. Such rethinking had already started to take shape with the short-lived Redirected
Mediterranean Policy (RMP) in 1989. With the violence then simmering in Algeria and its crossing to Europe to take place in France in December 1994, the need to revamp policies towards the Maghreb and, in particular, to consolidate the discourse on security, democracy and human rights became critical. The outcome of these security worries was a major revamp in the EU policies toward North Africa and the 'upgrading' of its relationship with the region to the level of a partnership, as embodied in the EuroMaghreb Partnership of 1992 (European Commission, 1992 ). Yet, though the EuroMaghreb Partnership idea died out as originally proposed, its spirit of democracy 2 promotion and political dialogue, as conditions for peace, lived on in the principles of the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Declaration establishing the EuroMediterranean Partnership (EMP) in November 1995.
Within the framework of the EMP's political and security basket, this chapter examines how security and democracy discourses interact and affect one another; it also considers the role the institutions and practices put forward to implement the EMP's agenda play in the convergence of the views on security and democracy entertained by the EU on the one hand, and North African governments, on the other. For this purpose, this chapter is divided into four sections. Section one briefly describes the context that has triggered the securitisation of North Africa and the proposals put forward to tackle security and ensure stability in the region. Section two outlines the main political and security partnership arguments and their content. Section three looks into the interaction between security and democracy discourses, highlighting the gap resulting thereof.
Finally, section four examines the extent to which the EMP institutions and practices can bridge the gap between security and democracy, discussing the factors that contribute to or preclude developments in this direction.
Political securitisation and the stabilising importance of democracy
The socio-economic and political realities of the 1980s in North Africa stripped the postindependence nationalist discourses of their legitimacy and exposed the failure of the North African regimes to keep or deliver on their post-independence promises. The decline in oil and phosphate revenues in 1986 coupled with the IMF's structural adjustment programmes generated greater difficulties for the Maghreb governments and uncovered their inability to sustain their colossal administrative apparatuses and public services through thick and thin. Faltering and debt-burdened economies, together with political authoritarianism and demographic growth, provided, it seemed, the perfect recipe for socio-economic and political frustration. This tense environment forced an upsurge of internal demands for political liberalisation and external pressures asking for the establishment and respect of democratic institutions and the rule of law. On the other hand, the absence of real democratic political openings has also been perceived from the European side as a major obstacle to the construction of peace and stability in the region. In the face of the lack of genuine multi-party political culture or Africa. The complexity of this agenda lies in the difficulty to balance between the discourse on securitisation and that on democratisation. This is largely underpinned by 7 the reaction to Islamism being caught between two extremes. On the one hand, there is a democratic risk that the North African regimes are to take in allowing for a free and fair participation of the Islamists. On the other hand, there is a risk to democracy that fears of the Islamists 'instrumentalising' democracy and then 'hijacking' it after getting to power generate. In face of this, what has the EU proposed to tackle this security/democracy situation and how are its proposals being adopted and adapted by the North African regimes?
The framework: the political and security dialogue and its content
In line with the democratic peace argument, the establishment of a political and security dialogue between the EU and the Maghreb countries started to be seen as an important means for promoting political reforms and, eventually, guarantee stability and security in the region. The entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the establishment of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) contributed to enshrine the promotion of human rights and democratic practices more markedly as a cornerstone and instrument of the EU's external relations and as an integral part of its development and cooperation policies towards third countries (Clapham, 1999: 632-36) . In a wider the political and security remits. However, there seems to be ambiguity and misunderstanding on how this is to be carried out and, more important, on the speed with which it is to be undertaken.
A security-democracy gap or the realm for ambiguity?
For the above democracy and security agenda to be implemented within the framework proposed, a number of supportive discourses, institutions and practices need to be put in place and developed to deliver it. As previously mentioned, securitisation and democratisation discourses are advanced in relation to North Africa (and the Mediterranean at large) as legitimising forces for the implementation of the EMP agenda.
In theory, these two discourses are put forward as complementary, mainly because of the political and security culture prevailing at the level of the EU. The general premise is that the promotion and support of democracy, human rights and the rule of law will bring about political stability and economic development and lead, eventually, to the establishment of a security situation conducive to the building of a 'security community' in the Mediterranean region. However, a closer look at how these two discourses interact within the Barcelona Process gives a picture of two discourses that are often in competition with one another. There seems to be a divergence between democracy and security and, on certain occasions, the two discourses appear even mutually exclusive. It is important, therefore, to understand how the discourses on security and democracy in the Maghreb and the EU interact and affect each other within the EMP context.
The security discourses surrounding the EMP have been its main floating board since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995 (Spencer, 2001 ). This Moreover, d espite joint fears about the consequences of full political liberalisation, security lacks a common meaning. In North Africa, security is strongly linked to questions of national security and regime stability and seen in terms of further access to EU markets as a basis of socio-economic development. On the other hand, in the EU security is conceived mainly in terms of the promotion of regional stability through encouraging human rights and democratic practices, governance and the rule of law. The 9/11 has contributed to bring the security discourses of the Maghreb and the EU closer together, especially through enhanced cooperation in the field of JHA. The
Maghrebi regimes used the 9/11 attacks to condemn terrorism in general, but also to highlight the EU's lack of understanding and appreciation towards their own fight against 'internal terrorism'. 5 Some of them used these events to eschew real political and structural problems and stress a 'conspiracy theory' that was mounted by external elements against some incumbent regimes in the Maghreb (Martinez, 2003: 11-12) . On the whole, the 9/11 events might have brought about a rapprochement between the EU and North Africa on what constitutes a threat to security. This however does not necessarily mean a further agreement on how to tackle these security threats and what practices need to be promoted in order to do so.
The security worries plaguing the Mediterranean have largely shaped the discourse on democracy promotion in the Maghreb. The need for security has given birth to EU projects calling for 'change within continuity' and 'dynamic stability' -projects which translate a cautious yet ambiguous approach to security and democracy promotion in the region. In characteristic fashion of semi-authoritarian regimes (Ottaway, 2003) , this ambiguity gives the North African leaders flexibility to foster democratic principles without taking them beyond the discursive level and to selectively adopt only changes that do not jeopardise their position, if not consolidate it. With the relative exception of Morocco, the objective of state-managed political overture in the Maghreb has so far been to give opposition groups a venue to let off steam and allow for their political participation. However, this overture has remained controlled and limited in order to preclude factors that might undermine the ultimate power of the regime. Thus, the EU's softly-softly approach and the ambiguity of its discourse on democracy has often been exploited by less open governments, leading to further suppression of political freedom and the delay of sensitive and genuine reforms, especially following the events of September 11 attacks and the 'legitimized' pretext to fight terrorism.
Moreover, besides their ambiguity, EU projects to promote democracy in the Maghreb remain limited in scope. They do not tap into deeper structures to enable qualitative and substantive reforms. The meaning of democratisation the EU promotes appears to be confined to human rights issues and the rule of law (meaning more transparency). This is so for a number of reasons. First, the EU is still too cautious, worried to keep the EMP afloat with all the initial partners aboard and persistent in its attitude of 'change within continuity'. Second, emphasis on the establishment and consolidation of the rule of law seems in line with the need for more transparency, which will encourage European investment in the region and enhance economic development.
Third, focus on human rights issues gives credibility to the EU's democracy efforts before its citizens.
These remarks should not be seen as a criticism of the slow, softly-softly approach of the EU. However, even slow and cautious approaches have to embark upon and encourage reforms in the underlying institutional and constitutional structures responsible for the lack of democracy in the Maghreb. For instance, the conditionality clause, which has been confined to the 'realm of rhetoric', could be used to push forward for substantial qualitative changes that would foster some convergence in the democracy and security agenda between the Maghreb and the EU. Limiting democratisation to these efforts permits the EU to circumvent those issues that have a direct involvement in the region's sensitive political agenda or that might have institutional and constitutional leverage with serious consequences for democracy. True, EU projects for democracy promotion have contributed significantly to the growth in civil society. However, the 13 political load in the Maghreb is too heavy to carry for the civil society active there. This civil society is not powerful or experienced enough to affect serious constitutional or institutional changes. Nor does it have enough political leeway to do so; it is either too close to the regime and manipulated by it or too politicised and fragmented to push collectively for change. Notwithstanding its role, its efforts cannot, however, compensate for disorganisation at the party political system and weak parliaments.
Thus, securitisation in the region together with the discourse and practices supporting it tends to undermine the democratisation agenda, and ultimately the very security goals it is trying to achieve. This is so largely because of the primacy of security issues in politics but also because of the ambiguity of the discourse on democracy promotion. The democracy promotion has fallen short of its own rhetoric once faced with its own consequences (e.g. the rise of Islamist movements) or conflicts with security interests. Thus, concerns about security contribute to blocking the launch of genuine political reforms that are in turn a necessary condition for ensuring peace, security and stability. In this sense, democracy and security have become mutually dependent: for security to be established it needs genuine political reforms but these reforms are more likely to take place only and only when they do not constitute a threat. Indeed, less threat has made some political reforms more possible in Morocco than in Algeria or Tunisia.
The existence of a large political opposition in Morocco, for instance, has allowed the Islamist PJD to participate and compete in the elections without generating threats of a landslide Islamist victory. Nor does the PJD itself want to win any such victory as it refrained from filing their candidates in all constituencies during the September 2002 legislative elections (Willis, 2004) . The PJD's tendency to accommodate and assuage national fears of its development have been more pressing during the September 2003 local election, bearing in mind the Casablanca bombing and growing allegations about its links with other radical movements within the country.
As such, beyond ambiguous references and rhetorical declarations, there is a serious lack of clear discourse to initiate and support policies that are conducive to the construction of a security partnership. The interaction between security and democracy discourses has consequences on and implications for the institutions and practices put forward to implement their agenda. Discourses can have a cognitive as well as a 14 normative function in providing framework and guidance to support policies and practices for implementing them (Schmidt, 2000: 280-81) . Therefore, discourse ambiguity affects the efficiency of these institutions, delays their proper functioning and confuses practices. None the less, if discourse can frame policies and practices, these policies and practices could, in a mutually constitutive manner, inform a change in the discourse. That is, policies and the institutions and practices through which they are being implemented can feed back into the discourse itself thereby affecting a transformation in the desired direction. As such, institutions and practices have the power not only to transform discourse but also to create a certain convergence by reducing misunderstandings and constructing a common social reality. What are then the EMP's institutions and practices and how can they effect and shape such change?
Institutions and practices
Institutions and practices are of great importance in influencing state behaviour (Botcheva and Martin, 2001 ) and clarifying the discourse and frameworks for action, the aim being to bring closer together different social realities and their supportive discourses and practices. Through institutions a nd learning practices, different discourses can converge to produce a common social reality owing to 'cognitive evolution' -this being a process that accounts for the diffusion, institutionalisation and learning of norms which help converge the interests of governments towards similar, compatible interpretations of the material reality in which they interact (Adler, 1997) . The working of 'cognitive evolution' and the impact of institutions are exercises with long-term consequences.
None the less, it is reasonable at this stage to enquire into the strength of the institutions and practices put in place for the implementation of the EMP's political and security agenda and their ability to enhance the convergence of the security and democracy discourses into a sustainable security partnership.
The EMP Institutions
The EMP's agenda as outlined in the three constitutive chapters of the Barcelona Declaration is discussed at both bilateral and multilateral/regional levels, each having separate institutional arrangements. In respect of its regional institutional structure, the Committee has the power to set up specialised sub-committees or working groups with the aim of intensifying bilateral cooperation and holds responsibility for monitoring them.
In this context, the Commission Delegations abroad play an important coordinating role, especially following reforms to the structure of the Commission's External Relations and the deconcentration of its responsibilities.
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The entry into force of the association agreement between the Maghreb countries and the EU has contributed to enhance the political dialogue and its institutionalisation. It will also help to develop those areas that could yield more results at a bilateral level. A look at the sub-committees and working groups created for this purpose is quite telling.
In the case of Morocco -the country that has the highest number of sub-committees and working groups -these sub-committees cover a variety of issues related mainly to the 
Practices, interests and constraints
The above regional and bilateral institutional arrangements put in place for the implementation of the EMP provide, in theory, a good opportunity for dialogue and cooperation in order to fine-tune the security and democracy practices and the discourse supporting them. These institutions constitute a platform for interaction and a venue for Indeed, the 'neighbourhood policy' clearly seeks to enlarge the EU's zone of peace to eastern and southern neighbours. To do this the EU uses a number of economic and political incentives. The use of the EU's normative power in eastern European has been supported by promises of membership. In the Mediterranean, this normative power is consolidated by incentives ranging from to 'more effective political dialogue to 'perspective of integration into transport, energy and telecommunication networks'. In other words, for the bons élèves of the EMP, the incentives will be as great as to share, in the words of Romano Prodi, 'everything except institutions'. To enlarge its zone of peace, the EU intends to do this through adopting 'Action Plans' to work with every individual partner in defined areas.
Whether the EU normative power would be of significance without the economic incentives and opportunities the EU presents is difficult to prove. Admittedly, the economic stakes and incentives involved in the successful implementation of the economic chapter of the EMP are tempting and have provided a launching pad for the Barcelona Process. However, shortly after the signing of the Barcelona Declaration, the political and security chapter has proven difficult to manage and is one of the chapters where little progress has been made. In constructing any policy project or program, policy-makers and elites are often faced with interests and constraints which combine to give priority to certain issues but prevent others from appearing on the political and security agenda. As discussed above, the discourses on security and democracy in the western Mediterranean, when they do not diverge, remain ambiguous. This is because the prevailing security cultures differ from the EU to North Africa and even between North African countries themselves. These security cultures frame and largely define the security discourse that is put forward to support a certain security agenda and to preclude another from developing.
Most of the issues discussed so far on the agendas of the EMP's bilateral and regional institutions still eschew sensitive security and political reforms. This is motivated by a number of reasons. In general, there is the importance of short term interests that dominate politics. There is also a persistent worry in the EU not to upset partner countries and to keep all initial EMP members on board. Moreover, fear and uncertainty about the result of proactive actions and programmes often act as major constraints. What is more, the economic benefits to be reaped from the construction of an FTA in the Mediterranean are considerable and tend to discourage actions that would disrupt its scheduled development or lead to socio-political instability and violence that would jeopardise it altogether. Therefore, interests in political stability to guarantee economic gains appear to constrain the introduction of genuine reforms with serious consequences for the political and security chapter.
Moreover, where political and security issues are discussed, serious doubts are cast on their practical results. For example, preliminary studies into the role of the Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum raised serious reservations about its role and points to inherent difficulties related to the legitimacy of its southern members. Another difficulty was seen to reside in the status of the representatives sent to the Forum. The tendency from the EU side is to send low profile personalities, especially from northern EU members (Stavridis, 2002) . Representatives from the Mediterranean side are often mouthpieces of their respective government. Therefore, though one might accept the important of these institutions as providing venues for dialogue and socialisation through norm-diffusion, their impact remain limited to economic issues and contingent on the development of working groups and sub-committees that are empowered to work toward dispelling the ambiguity surrounding the discourse on democracy and security. Until this is done, the security and political chapter will suffer from lethargy and setbacks.
Conclusion: an emerging security partnership?
All on all, owing to difference in the security culture prevailing in the EU and North Africa, securitisation and democratisation have unsurprisingly been perceived differently.
If in the EU democratisation has often been considered a major vector for the construction of peace and stability, in North Africa it, as presented by the EU, has been perceived as a major destabilising factor, often an intrusion in internal affairs. With the unfortunate, violent outcome of political liberalisation in Algeria, the strength of the democratisation discourse has been diluted, giving room for security worries and the consolidation of the security discourse. These security worries have so far hampered progress in the EMP's security and political dialogue. Because of the ambiguity and cautiousness surrounding security and democracy discourses, even the institutions and practices that are put in place to implement policies are not serving their full function and are being limited to and criticised as 'talking shops'.
On the whole, the ability of the EMP bilateral and regional institutions to overcome these constraints depends on the ideational (both cognitive and normative) merits of the discourses and policy programmes of the EMP representatives but also on their interactive ability to communicate and coordinate these discourses amongst themselves as well as to their general public at large (Schmidt, 2000: 287) . What these institutions allow at the moment is for interactive practices with the potential to diffuse but also fine-tune discourses in favour of the construction of prosperity, peace and stability in the Mediterranean and the building of a security community. However, in relation to democracy and security, these interactive practices are limited to discussing divergent standpoints without first agreeing on a common strategic language. Therefore, further dialogue to dispel ambiguity and stress a common language is called for. Indeed, during these discussions it is possible to use rhetorical actions (i.e. the strategic use of norm-based arguments) in order to push forward for a convergence of norms such as respect for democracy, human rights, governance and security. These norms should be able to go beyond the promotion of the rule of law and human rights to stress the 20 importance of and need for genuine institutional and systemic reforms that would guarantee full political liberalisation and democratisation.
In addition to official bilateral and regional interactive practices, the contact between the various Maghrebi and European civil society members and their increasing involvement in cooperative security issues (Lannon, 2002) constitutes a good base for the diffusion and promotion of democratic norms and practices at the local level. The construction and the consolidation of such networks are essential for the marketing and dissemination of norms and the promotion of norm-conforming behaviours that would ensure and encourage convergence towards full security partnership. Unless the EMP political and security practices are penetrated formally by institutions and informally by civil society members, its current institutions will have little to bear on the security and democracy dialogue, and the EMP itself is likely to suffer, despite the consensus amongst its elites, in its ability to mobilize people from both sides. With repetitive forums of little or no concrete result on security and democracy, the discourse on the construction of peace and security will tend to be perceived from the population in the south as political stagnation by other means. The political and security cooperation between the EU and the Maghreb countries appears at the moment to be a 'security complex-community', where major disagreements on security issues leading to enmity are being progressively reduced between the partner countries but where a system of common values is not (yet) being reached.
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